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Abstract
Existential, or non-somatic suffering, is often associated with the management of refractory pain
at the end-stage of life. Because of misleading sympathologies, this condition is often either misdiagnosed or even ignored. When diagnosed as a part of a futile medical condition, this Paper argues that
deep, palliative, or terminal sedation be offered to the distressed, dying patient as an efficacious and
ethical response to preserving a semblance of human dignity in the dying process. Not only is this option
of care humane and compassionate, it is consistent with the ideal of best patient care. The notion of care
should not only address and include somatic issues of intractable pain management, but—as well—nonsomatic or existential suffering occurring in the absence of physical symptoms. Interestingly, sound
holistic medicine traces its very province to the foundational value, or chrism of cura personalis which in
turn directs respect be given to all individuals and to their souls. The importance of preserving human
dignity should, thus, be recognized correctly as a human right. In sum, the doctrine of medical futility is a
proper template for evaluating degrees of end-of-life care. Acceptance of this principle allows—in turn—
for a greater openness to utilize palliative sedation.
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Long before Dame Cicely Saunders inspired and led the modern hospice movement in
1967, 1 which was founded on “total pain management” of physical, psychological, and spiritual
suffering, 2 the Society of Jesus, founded by St. Ignatius of Loyola in 1541, embraced the
principle of cura personalis as a foundational value or chrism. 3 Within this faith-based value
system, is a significant acknowledgment that “attention and respect must be given to the care of
an individual person and that person’s soul.” 4 In antiquity, Scribonius, a Roman physician, circa
47 A.D., is attributed as the progenitor of the notion that the profession of medicine should
espouse “a commitment to compassion or clemency in the relief of suffering.” 5
Today, the World Health Organization chooses to define the contemporary goal and use
of palliative care as that which “improves the quality of life for patients and families who face
life-threatening illness, by providing pain and symptom relief, spiritual and psychosocial support
from diagnosis to the end of life, and bereavement.” 6 Palliating the whole person—then—
requires medicine to attend more fully to existential suffering. For this type of palliation to be
efficacious, health care decision makers must regularly reassess patient treatment goals in order
to not only learn how their patients define and experience pain, but the patients’ thresholds for
tolerating various sources of distress. 7 These thresholds are seen as being informed by a patient’s
personality, which has, in turn, been shaped by life experiences and attitudes toward death
management and quality of life in end-stage illness. 8
Existential, or non-somatic suffering, is often associated with the end-stage of life and is
considered generally to be refractory. 9 Because of misleading symptomologies, this condition is
often either mis-diagnosed or even ignored. When diagnosed, as part of a futile medical
condition, this Paper argues that deep, palliative (or terminal) sedation be offered to the
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distressed (e.g., dying) patient as an efficacious and ethical response to preserving a semblance
of human dignity in the dying process 10—a state of dignity which surely must be recognized as a
human right. 11 As used in this context of death management, dignity or well-being is not seen as
the dignity that philosophers debate routinely. 12 Rather, it is to be taken as the term is used in
everyday conversation and shaped ideally from the lived experience of a patient throughout his
life. Commonly, dignity—for the average person—then, would mean an avoidance of
helplessness, incontinence, incoherency, dependency, being a burden to others, and of poor
general deportment. 13

I.
MANAGING END-STAGE ILLNESS
“Managing” death at the end-stage of life when a futile medical condition exists, presents
linguistic, moral, and philosophical ambiguities regarding the voluntary cessation of nutrition,
hydration, palliative or terminal sedation, physician-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. 14
Although these actions are distinct, there is a central and unifying commonality among them—
specifically, their common purpose of hastening a humane death and thereby showing
compassion to those suffering refractory pain and existential suffering. 15
The purpose of this Paper is to argue, and to advance the notion, that existential suffering
is as valid a consideration as physical pain is at the end-stage of life. Because of this relationship,
greater attention must be given by medicine to palliating the “whole person” and to accepting the
validity of palliative sedation. As efficacious and compassionate treatment when appropriate, 16
laws should—similarly—accommodate the necessity for this procedure as its use becomes
warranted under a theory of adjusted care. 17 The law should, further, validate palliative sedation
as humane end-of-life medical treatment and should not complicate, and thereby hinder, what are
4

sound medical responses—consistent with patient values—to alleviating conditions deemed
medically futile. 18 Legislation allowing for death with dignity as enacted in the state of Oregon, 19
Washington, 20 and Vermont 21 is—outside of state judicial action validating assistance in dying
when a futile medical condition exists 22—the most sensible approach toward achieving Social
Justice. 23

Best Patient Care
The President’s Council on Bioethics in the United States concluded in 2005 that the
basic standard for clinical decision-making should be one which promotes the best patient care. 24
This standard obviously must be adjusted continually as a patient’s case history progresses, 25 and
to promote patient care anchored in mercy, compassion, beneficence, and loving charity—care
which recognizes that relief of pain is the most universal moral obligation that a physician must
uphold and that there is, indeed, a right not to suffer. 26
Psychological distress, or existential pain, however, is usually difficult to assess because
evaluation requires special training and continual contact with the patients’ and their families.27
There is a general societal aversion to the obstacles faced in proving a patient’s emotional
distress at end-of-life care. 28 Distinguishing between depression and psychological morbidity is
difficult because the symptomology of disrupted sleeping patterns, loss of energy, and lack of
appetite are not exclusive response mechanisms to psychological distress, but appear in cancer
and other terminal illnesses as well. 29 Because of these difficulties and uncertainties, the
palliative management of existential pain has been largely neglected. 30
While no general “solutions” exist for meeting the existential needs of terminally ill
patients, attempts to meet these needs require careful listening skills and defined lines of
communication between health care providers, patients, affected families, and proxy or surrogate
5

decision makers. Valid existential concerns are often obscured during palliative care treatment. 31
Even though a patient may have no absolute control over the wide and varied spectra of
suffering, the patient still has freedom to choose what attitude is taken toward that suffering. 32
By extending end-of-life care to include psychiatric, psychological, existential and spiritual
issues—consistent with the WHO’s definition of palliative care and its goal of addressing total
patient needs 33—a more complete, compassionate, and realistic approach to managing terminal
illness and end-stage suffering would be implemented. 34

II.
ASSESSING PAIN
While pain is properly seen as biological and as measurable, it is—inherently—
subjective, individual and variable. 35 Consequently, there is no clear understanding whether
mental suffering and mental pain are, indeed, “equivalent or identical concepts and
experiences.” 36 Interestingly, some research has even suggested that the same brain regions
involved in assessing physician pain are also found similarly in a number of forms of actual
emotional distress. 37 The central issue confronting law is how to deal with the “externally
verifiable reality” of pain. 38 What level of exculpation should be granted by the state to those
attending to the anguish and suffering of those at the end-stage of life. 39 Can pain and suffering
in death be likened to the state’s responsibility to safeguard its citizens from suffering cruel and
unusual punishment? 40
Although existential pain has been defined as suffering “with no clear connection to
physical pain,” it has been recognized—nonetheless—as suffering, 41 which in fact, can be
expressed as physical pain. Today, existential pain is seen, commonly, as an important clinical
factor either reinforcing existing pain or, serving as the root cause of it. 42
6

Existential Suffering
The desire to hasten death arises because of a number of conditions: inadequate pain
management, psychological conditions ranging from depression and hopelessness, to fears of
loss of autonomy and physical functioning, 43 to futile and unbearable suffering, and avoidance of
humiliation. 44 All of these conditions conduce to one overriding fear: loss of human dignity, 45
which brings with it a fear of being forced to become but a “passive bystander” to all of the
normal functions of life. 46
In approximately twenty-five percent of all terminally ill patients, depression and other
mood disorders occur. 47 Yet, interestingly, few receive pharmacological aid through antidepressant prescriptions. 48 As this Paper shows, the main obstacle to a more liberal response to
these patients’ needs is the lack of clarity in determining when a distressed, terminal patient is
suffering from clinical depression or, instead, exhibiting a “normal grief response” to the dying
process. 49 The components of both of these syndromes are often vague, imprecise, and difficult
to evaluate. 50 Commonly, when patients are obsessed with feelings of worthlessness, they lose
their ability and desire to interact socially, and—indeed—lose their sense of hope, they are
properly assessed as suffering from clinical depression 51 and should be given whatever dosage of
analgesics is deemed necessary to alleviate that condition—because, pharmacotherapy is
ultimately the principal tool for symptom control. 52
Another drawback to accurate and prompt evaluations of psychological distress or
existential suffering is often the inability of a physician or palliative care management team to
understand patient views about suffering. As a spiritual phenomenon, suffering is often accepted
in Christian communities as a meaningful and authentic community response to Jesus Christ’s
own suffering. 53 In some faith communities, cultural efforts are expanded in order to view
suffering—physically and mentally—as a positive, reinforcing value. Merely accepting suffering
7

as authentic, however, does not mean that it is also meaningful. 54 It remains for the physician to
ascertain and then listen carefully to the spiritual parameters within each patient’s character 55 in
an attempt to treat those seriously ill as “whole persons.” 56 In this way, the therapy is truly
patient-centered. 57
Refractory existential suffering—or those symptoms which defy adequate control despite
all efforts to provide relief—is difficult to distinguish during the end stages of life from physical
distress. 58 Those additional refractory symptoms most commonly reported as requiring palliative
sedation are: various degrees of agitation, restlessness or distress, confusion, respiratory distress,
pain, and myoclonus (e.g., severe twitching, jerking or uncontrollable shakes). 59
Existential care is more often than not left to the nursing staff. 60 Even in the daily
hospital bed environment, however, the nursing staff must possess a special level of sensitivity to
understand patients’ indirect questions regarding the depth and severity of their distress over
their terminal illness. Once understood, it typically falls upon the nurses to devise a procedure
for providing empathetic support. 61 Palliative sedation therapy is thus defined as “the use of
sedative medications to relieve intolerable and refractory distress by the reduction in patient
consciousness.” 62 When patient suffering—physical or existential—becomes refractory to
standard palliative therapies, the human, compassionate and merciful response is to offer
palliative or terminal sedation. 63 This approach to medical treatment may be seen as consistent
with sound principles of adjusted care. 64

Cancer Pain Management
The management of pain in cancer patients is very often a significant challenge—this,
because of the sub-optimal use of opioids. Studies conducted from 2008 through 2011, have
shown conclusively that upwards of 43% of patients having cancer pain, received inadequate
8

care. 65 Poor pain assessment, patient reluctance to report pain and to access opioids, physician
reluctance to prescribe opioids and a perception of excessive-regulation of controlled substances,
combine to serve as high barriers for easy access by oncologists seeking to effectively manage
pain. 66
Not only does poorly managed pain care compromise emotional and cognitive functions,
but it curtails the activities of daily living as well as family and professional functioning. 67
Feelings of depression can also result from inadequate pain control to a point where at least onethird of cancer patients with refractory pain feel that they want to die. 68 Although the past twenty
years have shown a remarkable frankness and openness in the oncology community about pain
management, surveys from 1990 and 2009 have shown real gaps in knowledge and comfort
levels among oncologists in their use of opioids to manage pain. 69 A 2009 survey found 60% of
oncologists gave incorrect responses to questions concerning clinical scenarios for management
of break-through pain. 70
Normal responses for patients with cancer—even among mentally healthy patients are—
hopelessness, anxiety, and fear. Termed the six D’s, the universal fear of cancer patients have
been classified as: death, dependency, disfigurement, disability interfering with normal life
functions, disruption of relationships, and discomfort or pain resulting from the disease itself. 71
The extent to which a patient copes with these fears is a function of a number of factors
including: the nature and progression of the disease itself; the individual patient’s level of
psychological adjustment prior to the onset of the disease; the extent to which the disease
threatens to impair the normal activities of the patient; the culture, ethical perspective and
religion of the patient; the patient’s support network; the patient’s potential for rehabilitation;
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and the patient’s personal style for coping. 72 Critically ill patients are seen coping with similar
psychological reactions. 73

III.
COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT
Depending upon the physiological nature of a patient’s illness and the medical treatments
provided to cure the illness, cognitive impairment may well result. With cancer patients,
oftentimes, “fatigue, recovery from surgery and radiation,” together with toxicity from drugs—
including antibiotics and pain medicines—may alter thinking abilities, going so far as to
“dampening the sharpness, rapidity, and productivity of the thought processes of a patient.” 74
For the terminally ill patient hospitalized for extended periods of time, additional
physical as well as psychological responses to “coercive” hospital environments may—
additionally—hamper cognitive capacity to make informed, rational health choices and
decisions. 75
Unfamiliar health care environments—together with increased sensory inputs found
commonly at all hospitals, result in sleep deprivation—which, in turn, not only exacerbate the
physical and emotional trauma of terminal illness, but often lead to lassitude, lethargy,
hallucinations, irritability, poor judgment, paranoid ideation, and hostility. 76
With a diagnosis of medical futility from a terminal illness, comes—oftentimes—a
profound psychological patient response, which in turn causes a variety of psychopathologies. 77
Indeed, psychological symptoms may well be exacerbated by the physiological symptoms of
disease. Compounding this situation may be the reluctance of patients to question the very
authority of their treating physicians which has the effect of compromising a terminally ill
patient from engaging in autonomous, rational decision-making. 78
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There is no consensus among psychologists regarding both the emotion and
psychological process which occur, normally, when a terminal diagnosis is given. While Freud
hypothesized that he general human fear of death was rooted actually in a fear of the unknown,79
others have opined that “death anxiety does not pertain to physical death, but to the primordial
feelings of helplessness and abandonment; thus, “the fear of the unknown or death is the fear of
the unknown of annihilation of self, of being, of identity.” 80
What is agreed upon, however, is that diagnosis of terminal illness, makes death
imminent and quite often forces a patient’s realization of the inevitable and the need to address
what, in the past, had been suppressed anxieties and fears. 81 This “crisis of diagnosis” often
triggers latent psychological issues of “dependency, passivity, and narcissism.” 82
“Therapeutic misconceptions” are common when patients participate as subjects in Phase
1 cancer research. One study found patient motivation to participate was because, almost
exclusively, a hope of being cured from their illness. While expressing subjectively an
understanding of the potential risks and benefits of the research, in fact, “they were unaware that
the purpose of the research was to study does schedules and toxicity levels of drugs, not to cure
them.” 83

European Approaches to Psychogenic Pain
Belgium, the Netherlands, and more recently—Switzerland, have allowed compassionate
medical assistance in those cases where non terminal patients have endured a constant (or
permanent) level of mental suffering which qualifies as a chronic mental disease (e.g.,
manic/depression or bipolar disorder) after years of “debilitating anxiety” or even possibly the
“agonies of arthritis.” 84
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In 1995, the Royal Dutch Medical Association determined that no valid distinction is
drawn between physical and mental suffering. 85 Yet, the Association cautioned that in making
medical evaluations of non-somatic illnesses, great care and caution should be exercised in
assessing both the gravity and the depth of hopelessness consequential to the primary medical
condition. 86

CONCLUSIONS
The whole person care paradigm is, perhaps, the greatest challenge to health care
management in the twenty-first century; and, at the same time, holds the greatest promise for
realization. 87 Death anxiety and existential concerns challenge not only patients, but—as well—
health professionals, 88 and patients’ families. 89 Indeed, non-somatic suffering is just as
significant as somatic pain at all levels of society. 90 Physicians and other healthcare providers
“need to recognize how their own non-conscious death fears, combined with the abundant
reminders of death that are typical of medical practice . . . influence how they diagnose and treat
patients.” 91
The psycho-social and the spiritual aspects of healthcare become more prominent with
every biotechnological advance 92—this, essentially because of their interconnectedness 93 and
goal-sharing of alleviating pain and suffering at all levels 94 and the further growing realization
that scientific research is revealing some “specific biological pathways, notably in the brain,
mediating social and psychological processes.” 95 Practical effectiveness of good clinical
medicine today requires “establishing a genuinely human relationship between patient and
doctor.” 96 Achieving this can only be accomplished by “considering all facets of the person,
including their beliefs (faiths) and spiritual understanding.” 97
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Rather than being completely socialized into a Western medical culture which
predisposes them to “do more” (e.g., investigations, interventions and uses of new medical
technologies), 98 and thus emphasizing “curing and fixing” rather than “healing/bearing
witness/being with,” contemporary healthcare professionals need to be more intellectually honest
and forthcoming in acknowledging when “death is imminent, inevitable, and perhaps timely.”99
Patient adjusted care demands—first and foremost—a standard of total honesty between patient
and physician 100—for, without it, there can be no conscious opportunity for informed consent to
be operative. 101 When both the healer and the patient are capable of confronting, specifically,
their existential fears regarding a terminal medical condition and the mortality that attaches to
it, 102 whole person care and the very integrity of “cura personalis” are validated; an appropriate
measures may be undertaken in order to alleviate the conditions. Proportional humane medical
responses to patient suffering—of whatever character—at the end-stage of life, should be given
medically and allowed legally. 103

Praxis
Chronic disease and illness is multi-dimensional. 104 Late middle to old age brings
multiple, life-limiting co-morbidities that will lead, ultimately, to a downward spiral to death
itself. 105 Rather than emphasizing survival at all costs, quality and functioning should—ideally—
be the goals of medical care during this final phase of life. 106 Realizing the meaning of the word,
“health,” to make whole again, cannot be achieved at the end-stage of life does not mean nothing
can be done to restore harmony or physiological and psychological function. 107 Rather, it should
be realized that, “to care, comfort, be present, help with coping, and to alleviate pain and
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suffering are healing act as well as cure. In this sense, healing can occur when the patient is
dying even when cure is impossible.ˮ 108
All too often, deficiencies in clinical practice, which mar the treatment and care of
advanced chronic disease patients, can be traced to a core deficiency in clinical praxis. 109 Praxis,
then, should mean more than the application of theory or of philosophy. Rather, praxis means
action informed and shaped continuously by critical reflection on the end of action, on the means
to the end, and on salient dimensions of the context within which action unfolds. 110 In cases of
terminal illness, “existential preparedness” or the ability to shepherd a patient (or the patient’s
family) along a course accepting the eventuality of the dying process is a noble principle of
clinical practice. 111
Taxonomical “purities” often compound, as seen, confusion over the issue of assistance
in dying from a terminal illness or—alternatively—committing assisted suicide. 112 This
“ongoing confusion,” in turn, contributes directly to “a cluttered moral and legal matrix.”113
Rather than continue the quest to establish a constitutional right to assisted suicide, perhaps the
time-honored Common Law right to refuse treatment should be seen as the cornerstone for
building a more compassionate and enlightened ethics of understanding when managing end-oflife issues. This right of refusal is not a right to hasten death, but merely a right to resist
unwanted physical invasions. 114
Whether operable normative standard for policy-making in managing death is termed
agape, charity, compassion, love or mercy, the common unifying denominator in palliative care
is a humane, morally responsible approach to dealing with intractable suffering at the end-stage
of life. 115
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Ongoing Dialogue
A national dialogue must continue over how best to “manage death” at its end-stage. 116
An integral part of this discussion must evaluate humane, compassionate, approaches, together
with efficacious medical treatments which seek to balance vitalism, or sanctity of life, with
quality of life as consistent with established or sound medical practices. 117
As well, wise consideration should be expanded in this dialogue which allows for
acceptance of the notion that old age is—in actuality—a terminal illness. The key, then, is to be
informed and educated to this eventuality and thus be prepared for what is to come.
A compassionate and a logical option for those in advanced age who do not wish to
continue their lives in a terminal or futile condition should be early terminal sedation.118
Inspired by the concept of Death Cafes, or places where individuals could meet, casually,
and discuss all issues of death management (e.g., cemeteries, hospital care, funerals, hospices)
first seen in France and Switzerland, in 2010, a Web programmer in England, Jon Underwood,
introduced this notion to Great Britain. 119 Presently, there are 750 death cafes in 17 countries,
with more than 500 in the U.S. since they were introduced there in 2012. 120
These are positive frameworks for promoting end-of-life planning and surely will go far
toward setting the ultimate standard of medical care and assuring autonomous decision making
for those dying.
In the United States, it is estimated that spending on end-of-life care is between ten to
twelve percent of overall spending for healthcare. 121 Between 25 to 30 percent of all Medicare
benefits are expended for end-of-life care. 122 There is a significant volume of evidence which
substantiates the conclusion that, in multiple health care settings such as hospitals and in nursing
homes, hospices are cost effective. 123
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The central ethical question in death management remains: namely, the extent to which
“marginally beneficial” treatment should be offered and then maintained. 124 Because of the
inherently subjective nature of weighing costs versus benefits and considering over-utilization or
under-utilization of medical care and treatment, a “just right” mean between these options will be
exceedingly difficult to set or establish. 125
The doctrine of medical futility is an efficacious framework for principled decision
making within the medical profession. 126 Acceptance of this doctrine as a construct for medical
decisions allows—in turn—for a greater openness to utilize palliative sedation. When necessary
to accommodate the best interests of a patient and to alleviate refractory pain and suffering,
compassion and common sense, then, become the cornerstones of end-of-life management, care
or treatment. 127
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